This paper introduces a cryptographic engine, Janus, which assists clients in establishing and maintaining secure and pseudonymous relationships with multiple servers. The setting is such that clients reside on a particular subnet (e.g., corporate intranet, ISP) and the servers reside anywhere on the Internet. The Janus engine allows each client-server relationship to use either weak or strong authentication on each interaction. At the same time, each interaction preserves privacy by neither revealing a client's true identity (except for the subnet) nor the set of servers with which a particular client interacts. Furthermore, clients do not need any secure long-term memory, enabling scalability and mobility. The interaction model extends to allow servers to send data back to clients via e-mail at a later date. Hence, our results complement the functionality of current network anonymity tools and remailers.
INTRODUCTION
We consider the following problem: there is a set of clients located on a particular subnet and a set of servers on the Internet. For example, the set of clients could be employees on a company's intranet or subscribers of an ISP and the servers could be web sites. (See Figure 1 , where the c i are clients and the s j are servers.) A client wishes to establish a persistent relationship with some (or all) of these servers, such that in all subsequent interactions (1) the client can be recognized and (2) either weak or strong authentication can be used. At the same time, clients may not want to reveal their true identity nor enable these servers to determine the set of servers each client has interacted with so far (establishing a dossier). This last property is often called pseudonymity to denote persistent anonymity. Equivalently, a client does not want a server to infer through a relationship more than the subnet on which the client is located, nor to associate different relationships with the same client. This paper introduces a client-based cryptographic engine that allows a client to efficiently and transparently establish and maintain such relationships using a single secret passphrase. Finally, we extend our setting to include the possibility of a server sending data to a client via e-mail.
We consider the specification and construction of a cryptographic function that is designed to assist in obtaining the above goal. Such a function needs to provide a client, given a single passphrase, with either a password (weak authentication) or a secret key (strong authentication) for each relationship. Furthermore, a username might be needed as well, by which a client is (publicly) known at a server. Such passwords, secret keys, and usernames should neither reveal the client's true identity nor enable servers to establish a dossier on the client. We name such a cryptographic function (engine) the Janus function (engine). We briefly review arguments why simple choices for the Janus function, such as a collision-resistant hash function, are not quite satisfactory for our purposes, and consequently show a Janus function that is more robust. We also show how to implement a mailbox system on the client side, such that a server can send e-mail to a client without requiring any more information than necessary for client authentication.
We implemented a practical system called the Lucent Personalized Web Assistant (LPWA) that provides pseudonymous persistent relations between users and web-sites on the Internet. LPWA employs the Janus function to generate site-specific personae for a given user. The personae consist of alias usernames, passwords, and e-mail addresses.
Related Work and Positioning of Our Work
Network anonymity is being extensively studied (see, e.g., Pfitzmann and Waidner [1986] ; Goldberg et al. [1997] ). For example, Simon [1996] gives a precise definition for an anonymous exchange protocol allowing parties to send individual messages to each other anonymously and to reply to a received message. Implementation efforts for approximating anonymous networks are being carried out by several research groups (e.g., anonymous routing [Goldschlag et al. 1999] and anonymous web traffic [Goldschlag et al. 1999; Reiter and Rubin 1998] ). Besides that, there are several anonymous remailers available for e-mail communication (see, e.g., Goldberg et al. 1997; Gulcu and Tsudik 1996; Bacard 1999; Engelfriet 1997] , and web proxies that act as "middlemen" for web browsing (see, e.g., the Anonymizer [Boyan 1997 ] and LPWA [Gabber et al. 1999] ). We discuss some of these in more detail later.
We view our goal as complementary: All of the above work tries to find methods and systems to make the Internet an (approximately) anonymous network. This is a hard task, and consequently the resulting tools are rather difficult to use and carry some performance penalties. We focus on a method for assisting a client to interact with multiple servers easily and efficiently, such that the server cannot infer the identity of the clients among all clients in a given subnet, but at the same time the client can be recognized and authenticated on repeat visits. We do not address communication between a subnet and a server. Consequently, a server can easily obtain the particular subnet in which a client is located. In many cases, this degree of anonymity is sufficient, for example, if the client is a subscriber of a large ISP or an employee of a large company. In the language of Reiter and Rubin [1998] , the anonymity of such a client is somewhere between probable innocence and beyond suspicion. Alternatively, our method can be used in conjunction with existing remailers to enable a client to interact with a server without revealing the particular subnet. We elaborate on this point in Section 2 for client-initiated traffic and in Section 4.3 for server-initiated traffic. The works closest in spirit to the Janus engine are the visionary papers of Chaum [1981; 1985] on digital pseudonyms.
In Gabber et al. [1997] , we described the design and implementation of a web proxy that assists clients with registering at multiple web servers. In this paper we focus on a new, simpler, and correct construction of the Janus engine, a new and different method of conveying anonymous e-mail that greatly reduces the required trust in the intermediary, and a discussion of moving features to shift trust from a proxy to the client's machine. The latter allows, for example, a Janus engine to be integrated with the P3P proposal, giving clients the power to use pseudonymous P3P personae (see Section 5). Thus, our methods and design are applicable to a variety of client-server interactions, well beyond the proxied web browsing for server registration of Gabber et al. [1997] .
Outline: In Section 2 we describe our interaction model and our function requirements. Section 3 contains a detailed description of the Janus function. Section 4 extends the model of interaction to allow servers to send data to clients' anonymous mailboxes. Section 5 presents various applications and configurations and discusses some of the tradeoffs involved. Finally, Section 6 contains an overview of the Lucent Personalized Web Assistant (LPWA), an application of the Janus function. The Appendix provides more details on the design and implementation of LPWA.
MODEL AND SPECIFICATIONS
In this section we present the framework for interaction between clients and servers and the way in which the Janus engine is incorporated within such interaction. There is a set of clients Ꮿ ϭ ͕c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c N ͖ and a set of servers ϭ ͕s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s M ͖. Each client can interact with any server. Interaction can take place in one of the following two ways: -Client-initiated: A client c i decides to contact a server s j . The server s j requires c i to present a username and a password (secret shared key) at the beginning of this interaction to be used for identification and weak (strong) authentication on repeat visits.
-Server-initiated: A server s j decides to send some data to a client c i which has contacted s j at some earlier time (using the client's username).
Individual clients may wish to remain anonymous in the above interaction; i.e., a client does not want to reveal his or her real identity c i to a server (beyond the particular subnet on which c i is located).
Client-initiated interaction:
A client c i , on a first visit, presents to a server s j an alias a i, j , which includes a username and either a password or a key. On repeat visits, a client simply presents the password again for weak authentication or uses the key with a message authentication code (MAC) for strong authentication (see Matias et al. [1997] ). We would like the alias a i, j to depend on the client c i , the server s j , and a secret client passphrase p i . Since we want this translation of names to be computable, 
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• we define a function that takes c i , p i and s j , and returns an alias a i, j . This function is called the Janus function, and is denoted . In order to be useful in this context, the Janus function has to fulfill a number of properties:
(1) Form properties: For each server, provides each client with a consistent alias, so that a client, by giving his or her unique identity and passphrase, can be recognized and authenticated on repeat visits. should be efficiently computable given c i , p i , and s j . The alias a i, j needs to be accepted by the server, e.g., each of its components must have appropriate length and range.
(2) Secrecy of passwords/keys: Alias passwords/keys remain secret at all times. In particular, an alias username does not reveal information on any alias password/key.
(3) Uniqueness of aliases among clients and Impersonation resistance: Given a client's identity and/or her/his alias username on a server s j a third party can guess the corresponding password with only negligible probability. Moreover, the distribution of the alias usernames should be such that only with negligible probability will two different users have the same alias username on the same server.
(4) Anonymity/uncheckability of clients: The identity of the client is kept secret; that is, a server or a coalition of servers cannot determine the true identity of the client from her or his alias(es). Furthermore, it is not checkable whether a particular client is registered at a given server.
(5) Modular security and protection from creation of dossiers: An alias of a client for one server does not reveal any information about an alias of the same client for another server. This also implies that a coalition of servers is unable to build a client's profile (dossier) based on the set of servers with which he/she interacted by simply observing and collecting aliases.
One possible physical location to implement the Janus function is on the gateway. (See Figure 1 , where we refer to the implementation as the Janus engine.) Clients provide their identity c i and secret passphrase p i to the gateway, where the translation takes place. An alternative location for the Janus engine is on each client's machine, as depicted in Figure 2 , where the locally generated aliases are sent to the server via the gateway. (See Section 5 for a discussion of tradeoffs.) The following property is of practical significance because it provides robustness against the possibility of recovering privacy-sensitive information "after the fact": (6) No storage of sensitive data: When a client is not interacting with a server, the Janus engine does not maintain in memory any information that may compromise the above properties of the Janus function. This excludes the simple approach of implementing a Janus function by a look-up table.
Consequently, an entity tapping into a (gateway) machine on the subnet cannot infer any useful information, unless it captures a client's passphrase (which is never transmitted in Figure 2 ). Additionally, a client can use different Janus engines within his or her subnet, given that the client remembers his/her passphrase (mobility).
If a client desires to hide his or her subnet from a server, the client can easily combine our method with other anonymity tools. For example, if the client contacts a server via the web (HTTP), he/she can use either Onion routing [Goldschlag et al. 1999] or Crowds [Reiter and Rubin 1998 ]. In the first case, the connection from the gateway to the server is routed and encrypted similarly to the methods used by type I/II remailers (see Section 4.3), and in the second case the connection is "randomly" routed among members (on different subnets) of a crowd.
Server-initiated interaction: A server knows a client only by the alias presented in a previous client-initiated interaction. We allow a server s j wishing to send data to client c i , known to it as a i, j , to send an e-mail message to the corresponding subnet, addressed to the username component u of a i, j . The message is received by the Janus engine (see Figure 1 ), which will make sure that the message is delivered to the appropriate client or is stored by the gateway until a local Janus engine retrieves the messages, as in Figure 2 . Our scheme of storing mailboxes maintains forward secrecy. More details are provided in Section 4, where we also show Secure and Pseudonymous Client-Relationships
• how server-initiated interaction can be combined with pseudonymous remailers.
THE JANUS FUNCTION
In this section we present the Janus function in detail. We first develop our requirements and then discuss some possible constructions. The setting of the Janus-function: A client inputs his or her identity c i , the secret passphrase p i , the identity of the server s j , and a tag t indicating the purpose of the resulting value. Depending on this tag, the Janus function returns either an alias-username a i, j u for the user c i on the server s j or the corresponding password a i, j p . In this section we use the two tags u and p, but we can easily extend the function by adding additional tags to generate secret values for other purposes (see also Matias et al. [1997] ). For example, in Section 4 we extend the Janus function to a third tag, m, for the purpose of anonymous mailboxes. The Janus function may be placed on the gateway (as in Figure 1 ) or on the client's machine (as in Figure 2 ).
Adversarial model: We assume that a client c i does not reveal his or her passphrase p i to anyone (other than the Janus engine). However, we allow that an adversary E can collect pairs ͑a i, j u , a i, j p ͒ and the corresponding server names s j . Note that registered alias usernames may be publicly available on some servers and that we cannot assume that all servers can be trusted or that they store the passwords securely. In some cases it might even be possible to deduce a client name c i (e.g., from the data exchanged during a session, or simply because the client wishes to disclose his or her identity), and we also have to assume that a chosen message attack is possible (e.g., by suggesting to a client c i to register on a specific server). Roughly speaking, we require that an adversary does not learn more useful information from the Janus function than he/she would learn if the client chose all passphrases and aliases randomly.
Janus Function Specifications
Definition 1. We say that a client c i is corrupted if the adversary E was able to find p i . We say that c i is opened with respect to a server s j if the pair ͑a i, j u , a i, j p ͒ was computed and communicated to server s j . (Note that if c i was opened with respect to a server s j , then an adversary E may only know ͑a i, j u , a i, j p ͒ but not necessarily c i .) We say that c i has been identifiably opened with respect to a server s j if an adversary knows ͑a i, j u , a i, j p ͒ together with the corresponding c i .
Let Ꮿ be the set of clients, be the set of servers, ᏼ be the set of allowable client secret passwords, Ꮽ ᐁ be the set of allowable alias usernames, and Ꮽ ᏼ be the set of allowable alias passwords. Let k be the security parameter of our Janus function. Let the Janus function be : ͑Ꮿ ϫ ϫ ᏼ ϫ ͕u, p, m͖͒ ‫ۋ‬ ͕0,1͖ k . Since usernames and passwords normally consist of a restricted set of printable characters, we also need two functions that simply convert general k-bit strings into an appropriate set of ASCII strings. Thus let U : ͕0,1͖ k x Ꮽ ᐁ and P : ͕0,1͖ k x Ꮽ ᏼ be two injective functions that map k-bit strings into the set of allowable usernames and passwords. Let c i ʦ Ꮿ and p i ʦ ᏼ. The client's identity a i, j u and password a i, j p for the server s j are then computed by
The two functions U and P are publicly known, easy to compute and, we may assume, easy to invert. Thus knowing U ͑x͒ of some x is as good as knowing x. In particular, if an adversary can guess U ͑x͒ then he or she can guess x with the same probability. Following our adversarial model, the Janus function has to satisfy the following requirements:
(1) Secrecy: Given a server s j , an uncorrupted and not identifiably opened client c i and t ʦ ͕ p, u, m͖, the adversary E cannot find ͑c i , s j , p i , t͒ with nonnegligible probability even under a chosen message attack under the assumption that the adversary can get ͑c i , s jЈ , p i , tЈ͒ for any s jЈ s j or t tЈ.
(2) Anonymity: Given a server s j , two uncorrupted clients c i , c iЈ not opened with respect to s j and t ʦ ͕ p, u͖, then an adversary cannot distinguish ͑c i , s j , p i , t͒ from ͑c iЈ , s j , p iЈ , t͒ with nonnegligible probability even under a chosen message attack, under the assumption that the adversary can get ͑c iЈЈ , s jЈ , p iЈЈ , tЈ͒ for any list of arguments not used above.
Note that the two requirements are indeed different. For example, if we were to implement the function using a digital signature scheme, i.e., ͑c i , s j , p i , t͒ ϭ sig pi ͑c i \ s j \ t͒, then the first requirement would be satisfied, but not the second one, since the client's identity could be found by checking signatures. On the other hand, a constant function satisfies the second requirement, but not the first one.
Our requirements are stated in a rather general form. In particular, the first requirement states that no result of the Janus function can be derived from other results. This implies the secrecy of passwords, impersonation resistance, and modular security.
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Possible Constructions for
Assume that ᐉ c is the maximal bit length of c i , ᐉ s the maximal length of s j , ᐉ p the maximal length of p i and ᐉ t the number of bits required to encode the tag t. Throughout this section we assume that all inputs c i , s j , p i are padded to their maximal length. This will assure that the string c i \ s j \ p i \ t is not ambiguous.
Given the function specification, an ideal construction is via a cryptographic pseudorandom function f : ͕0,1͖
ᐉcϩᐉsϩᐉpϩᐉt ‫ۋ‬ ͕0,1͖ k . Unfortunately, there are no known implementations of pseudorandom functions. Typically, they are approximated via either strong hash functions or message authentication codes (MAC), even though, strictly speaking, the definitions of these primitives do not require them to be pseudorandom. In the following sections,we are going to examine both options and give some justifications for preferring a MAC-based solution over other tempting constructions.
Using Hash Functions.
One possible attempt might be to use the hash of the inputs h͑c i \ s j \ p i \ t͒ as our function. However, hash functions are not designed to keep their inputs secret. Even if it is hard to invert the hash function for a given input, it might still be possible to derive p i given h͑c i \ s j \ p i \ t͒ for many different servers s j . A hash function that is weak in that respect can, for example. be found in Anderson [1993] . Some apparently better constructions for keyed functions based on hash functions have been proposed (e.g., MDx-MAC [Preneel and van Oorschot 1995] ). A good discussion of hash functions can be found in Chapter 9 of Menezes et al. [1997] . But our requirements are quite different from the goals of the constructions above. Hence, we decided not to use hash functions for our Janus function.
MACs.
A much more promising approach is the use of message authentication codes (MACs). In particular, if MAC K ͑x͒ denotes the MAC of the message x under the key K, then we can define a potential Janus function as
This approach has the advantage that some of our requirements are already met. In particular, if the MAC is secure, then the secrecy of passwords and resistance to impersonation for the Janus function are implied. Other requirements, such as consistency, efficient computation of the function, single secret and acceptability, are just consequences of the actual implementation of the Janus function and the mappings U and P . The only additional requirement is the anonymity of clients.
To this end, we consider the following result of Bellare et al. [1984] : Let x ϭ x 1 , . . . , x m be a message consisting of m blocks x i of size ᐉ bits. Given a block cipher f K : ͕0,1͖ᐉ ‫ۋ‬ ͕0,1͖ᐉ where K denotes the key, define the CBC-MAC by
Assume that an adversary can distinguish a MAC K from a random function with an advantage ⑀ by running an algorithm in time t and makingueries to an oracle that evaluates either MAC K or the random function. Then the adversary can distinguish f K from a random function running an algorithm of about the same size and time complexity having an advantage of ⑀ Ϫ q 2 m 2 2 ϪᐉϪ1 . Hence, if we use CBC-MACs, then anonymity is just a consequence of Bellare et al. [1994] .
If the underlying block cipher f K behaves like a pseudorandom function, then the above result shows that a birthday attack is almost the best possible attack. In particular, an attacker cannot do much better than collecting outputs of the function and hoping for an internal collision, i.e., two messages x, y such that
In that case, the attacker would know that replacing the first i blocks in any message starting with x 1 , . . . , x i by y 1 , . . . , y i will result in another message having the same hash value.
We thus caution that a block cipher with ᐉ-bit block size should not be used if an attacker can collect about 2 ᐉ/ 2 m Ϫ1/ 2 MACs. Concretely, block ciphers having 64-bit blocks such as DES, triple-DES, or IDEA [Lai and Massey 1991] should not be used if it is feasible for an attacker to collect about 2 32 samples, thus giving only marginal security to the overall scheme. However, newer block ciphers such as some of the AES [National Institute of Standards and Technology 1999] candidates have 128 -bit block sizes and are therefore more suitable in this case.
AN ANONYMOUS MAILBOX SYSTEM
We first summarize the history of anonymous remailers, then describe our anonymous mailbox system, and finally discuss how enhanced privacy can be achieved by using our mailbox system in conjunction with remailers.
Brief History of Anonymous E-mail
Tools for anonymous e-mail communication have now been around for a few years (see, e.g, Goldberg et al. [1997] ; Bacard [1999] ; Gulcu and Tsudik [1996] ; and Engelfriet [1997] .) Early anonymous remailers (Type 0, e.g., Anon.penet.fi) accepted e-mail messages by a user, translated them to a unique ID, and forwarded them to the intended recipient. The recipient could use the ID to reply to the sender of the message. The level of security of this type of remailer was rather low, since it does not use encryption and keeps a plain text (translation) database. A next (and still current) generation of remailers (Type I, Cypherpunk remailers) simply takes a user's e-mail message, strips off all headers, and sends it to the intended recipient. Furthermore, the user can encrypt the message before sending it and the remailer will decrypt the message before processing it. For enSecure and Pseudonymous Client-Relationships • hanced security, a user can chain such remailers. In order to use a chain r 1 Ϫ r 2 of remailers, a user first encrypts the message for r 2 and then for r 1 (see also the efforts on Onion routing [Goldschlag et al. 1999] .) Still, even such a scheme is susceptible to traffic analysis, spam, and replay attacks. Mixmaster remailers (Type II) are designed to withstand even these elaborate attacks. This kind of remailer yields a more untraceable way of sending messages, but provides no way to reply to a message, giving rise to "pseudonymous/nym" remailers, which, in a nutshell, work as follows: A user chooses a pseudonym (nym), which has to be unused (at that remailer), then the user creates a public/private key pair for that nym. When sending a message, the user encrypts with the server's public key and signs a message with her private key. The recipient can reply to the message using the nym. Some remailers store the message, and the original sender can retrieve this mail by sending a signed command to the remailer. Other remailers forward the message directly by using a "reply block," an encrypted file with the user's real e-mail.
The ultimate goal of all these remailers is to enable e-mail communication as if the Internet were an anonymous network. This is a very hard task, and consequently these tools induce a performance penalty and are rather difficult to use.
Anonymous Mailboxes
In this section we show how to construct an anonymous mailbox system within our model. As before, we assume that the users are in a particular subnet. Our goal is to provide these users (clients) with a transparent way to give e-mail addresses to outside parties (servers) that maintains the properties of the aliases (anonymity, protection from dossiers, etc.). For example, a client might want to register at a (Web-site) server for mailinglists, personalized news, etc. Such an e-mail address provides a server with the means to initiate interaction with a client by sending an e-mail message to the client.
We first consider a setting with the Janus engine on the gateway ( Figure  1 ). We propose that the Janus engine compute "a i, j u @subnet-domain" as c i 's e-mail address to be used with s j . We further suggest storing a mailbox for each such active ͑c i , s j ͒ pair on the subnet's gateway, such that an owner of a mailbox is only identified by the respective alias. Messages are stored in these mailboxes to passively await clients to access them for retrieval. We require that (1) given a previous client-initiated interaction, a server can send data to the mailbox created for the (client, server) pair; (2) the Janus engine (upon being presented with ͑c i , p i ͒) lets a client c i retrieve the messages in all of her or his mailboxes without remembering a corresponding list of servers; (3) neither the Janus engine nor the mailboxes compromise the property that the server must not store sensitive data (see Section 2). In particular, knowledge of message e-mail headers (which contain a i, j u and s j ) does not reveal client identity c i . We show that the Janus function can be used to overcome the apparent contradiction of requirements (2) and (3). Note that the secrecy of the actual data stored within a mailbox is an orthogonal issue and can be solved, for example, by using available public technology such as PGP. For the setting of a Janus engine on each client (Figure 2) , most of the scheme above remains unchanged with one important exception: When a client wants to retrieve her or his messages, the local Janus engine tells the gateway which mailboxes to access, and hence p i is never revealed to the gateway.
Data structures for ͑c i , s j ͒-mailbox:
, m͒͒, where we use the tag m for the "mail index," n i , an integer indexing c i 's mailboxes, and M a corresponding injective function to map the output of into a suitable range. We explain the extensions, in turn, below. The following record R is stored with the ͑c i , s j ͒-mailbox. R has three fields: (1) R alias ϭ a i, j u ; (2) R index ϭ a i, ni m ; (3) R s ϭ s j . The argument n i in (2) indicates the index of the mailbox created for client ͑c i , p i ͒ and server s j . The record R (and consequently the mailbox) can be accessed both via R alias or R index . The R alias field contains the name of the mailbox that is used for messages sent from s j to the client c i . A second data structure, stored together with the mailboxes, holds a counter C i for each of the clients ͑c i , p i ͒. C i is the number of mailboxes the client ͑c i , p i ͒ has established so far. These counters are initialized to 0. Note that 0 Ͻ n i Յ C i . The counter itself is indexed by a i, 0 m , so that the Janus engine, upon being presented with ͑c i , p i ͒, can easily find it.
Creating a mailbox: Whenever the client c i instructs the Janus engine to give out an e-mail address for s j , the engine checks if a record R with R alias ϭ a i, j u already exists in the first data structure. If it does not exist, then the engine retrieves the counter C i by accessing the second data structure with the key a i, 0 m . If no C i is found, it is initialized to zero. The counter C i is incremented and a new record R is created, with R alias ϭ a i, j u , R index ϭ a i, Ci m , R s ϭ s j . Afterwards, the engine stores the updated value of C i in the second data structure with key a i, 0 m . Finally, the Janus engine creates a new mailbox under the name of R alias . Retrieving mail: Whenever client c i connects to the Janus engine, it will retrieve all of c i 's accumulated e-mail messages. The engine first retrieves the counter C i by accessing the second data structure with the key a i, 0 m . Then, it retrieves all records R with R index ϭ a i, ␥ m for 0 Ͻ ␥ Յ C i . For each such record R, Janus retrieves the corresponding mailbox and presents it, together with R s , to the client c i .
The above scheme constitutes a service for storing mail for any client and allows a client c i to retrieve all her or his mail upon presenting ͑c i , p i ͒. If c i is uncorrupted and not identifiably opened with respect to server s j , then adversary E cannot do better than guessing the identity of the corresponding mailbox. Furthermore, given any two such mailboxes, E cannot do Secure and Pseudonymous Client-Relationships • better than guessing whether they have the same owner. This is a simple consequence of the properties of the Janus function .
The above system can easily be extended to allow a client to actively send e-mail to servers using the Janus engine to generate a different address, depending on the server.
Combining our Solution with Pseudonymous Remailers
When we allow the adversary to execute more elaborate attacks (than we introduced in our model in Section 3), such as eavesdropping or traffic analysis, a client visiting several servers within a short period of time, might become vulnerable to correlation and building up dossiers (albeit not enough to compromise anonymity). Also, if a client happens to reside on a small subnet, the subnet's population might not be large enough to protect her or his identity. In these cases, it makes sense to combine our method with anonymous remailers or routing (for web traffic) for enhanced protection: We can view the Janus engine as a client's "front end" to a pseudonymous remailer. It computes the different nyms on a client's behalf and presents them to the remailer. It manages all the client's mailboxes and presents incoming messages to the client. It also manages a client's public/private keys for each nym. Furthermore, even the remailer closest to the client (of a possible chain) can neither infer the client's identity nor correlate different aliases. All this remailer sees (when decrypting a reply block) is the client's alias e-mail address.
TRADEOFFS AND APPLICATIONS
In this section we examine the tradeoff between the configurations corresponding to Figure 1 , which we refer to as the gateway approach and to Figure 2 , which we refer to as the local approach. We then present a few concrete applications.
Local vs. Gateway
The basic advantage of the local approach is that the Janus functionality is pulled all the way to the client's machine, minimizing outside trust. Thus, clients do not have to reveal their secret passphrases to another machine (the gateway). Client also have the flexibility to choose a mailbox location outside their own subnets, minimizing the trust in the subnet (e.g., the client's ISP). Although the local approach relaxes the trust relationship with the gateway, we assume that the gateway does not tag requests coming from the same machine.
There are also a number of scenarios where the Janus functionality is required to be on the client's machine: For example, in the realm of web browsing, the Janus engine can be integrated with the Personal Privacy Preferences (P3P) standard proposal to make a P3P persona (see Reagle and Cranor [1999] ) pseudonymous: P3P enables web sites to express privacy practices and clients to express their preferences about those practices. A P3P interaction will result in an agreement between the service and the client regarding the practices associated with a client's implicit (i.e., click stream) or explicit (i.e., client answered) data. The latter is taken from data stored in a repository on the client's machine, so that the client need not repeatedly enter frequently solicited information. A persona is the combination of a set of client preferences and P3P data. Currently, P3P does not have any mechanisms to assist clients to create pseudonymous personae. For example, a client can choose whether to reveal his/her real e-mail address, stored in the repository. If the e-mail address is not revealed, the Web site cannot communicate with the client, and if the e-mail address is indeed revealed, the web site has a very good indication of the identity of the visitor. Using a Janus engine provides a new and useful middle ground: The data in repository corresponding to usernames, passwords, e-mail addresses, and possibly other fields can be replaced by macros which, by calling the Janus engine, expand to different values for different web sites and thus create pseudonymous personae for the client.
For the case of the gateway approach, we note that the Janus engine does not have to be distributed throughout the subnet. Thus, the clients do not have to download or install any software and no maintenance is required, also giving scalability: when the population in the subnet grows, it is easy to add gateway machines (helped by the Forward Secrecy property). Of course, we assume that the gateway is trusted not to reveal the client's true identity or its passphrase and that the communication network between the client and the gateway is also trusted.
The proxy might also provide alias management capabilities in the case where the gateway is for a corporate intranet: Such capabilities might allow two clients to share their aliases for all the servers, a client to transfer one or more of his/her aliases to another client, or even two clients to selectively share some of their aliases. For example, when going on vacation, a manager might use such functionality to have an assistant take over some of his daily correspondence. Such alias management functions have the potential to considerably simplify login account and e-mail management in big intranets. We note that to achieve this potential, state has to be added to the proxy design, which goes beyond the scope of this paper.
Applications
Web browsing. There is a growing number of web sites that allow, or require, users to establish an account (via a username and password) before accessing the information stored on that site. This allows the web site to maintain a user's personal preferences and profiles and to offer personalized service. The Lucent Personalized Web Assistant [Gabber et al. 1999 ] is an intermediary web proxy that uses a Janus engine to translate a user's information (user's e-mail and passphrase) into an alias (username, password, email) for each web site. Moreover, this alias is also used by the web site to send e-mail back to a user. More details of this work can be found in Section 6, as well as in Gabber et al. [1997] . The intended configuration for this project is the gateway approach of Figure 1 . We note Secure and Pseudonymous Client-Relationships • that such concrete applications typically execute in conjunction with many other mechanisms, for instance, web browsing based on the HTTP protocol interfaces, among others, with SSL for encrypting the communication and with Java and JavaScript for downloadable executables. Each such interface can potentially undermine the pseudonymity of the client-server interaction. In the case of SSL, the proxy can spoof SSL on behalf of the internal client (see SSL FAQ). The proxy can initiate SSL between itself and other servers and thus maintain the client's pseudonymity. Both Java applets and JavaScript scripts, when downloaded from a server by a client, can potentially obtain compromising client information. Research is being conducted that might lead to including customizable security policies into these languages (see Gong et al. [1997] ; Anupam and Mayer [1998] ). A client can then choose a policy strict enough to preserve his/her pseudonymity. Another approach is to bundle an LPWA proxy with an applet/ script blocking proxy, as described, e.g., in Martin et al. [1997] . In summary, it is necessary to consider all possible interfaces and offer encompassing solutions to clients.
Authenticated web traffic. Consider a web site that offers repeated authenticated personalized stock quotes to each of its subscribers. The value of a single transaction (e.g., delivery of a web page with a customized set of quotes) does not warrant the cost of executing a handshake and key distribution protocol. A lightweight security framework for extended relationships between clients and servers was proposed recently . The Janus engine provides a persistent client-side-generated shared key for each server used in application-layer primitives. Hence, no longterm secure memory is needed on the client side, enabling scalability and mobility.
THE JANUS FUNCTION IN OPERATION: LPWA
The Lucent Personalized Web Assistant (LPWA) is a particular instantiation of the pseudonymous client-server scheme we describe above, customized for the web. LPWA provides consistent alias personae for people accessing personalized web sites, which require registration. Our goal was to build a system that could be readily deployed for public use. In the Appendix we briefly present the design and implementation of the public trial version of LPWA.
LPWA has the following three functional components:
-Persona generator: generates, on demand by a user, a unique consistent site-specific persona. The generator requires two pieces of identity information from a user: a User ID, which is a valid Internet e-mail address for the user; and a Secret, which serves as a universal password. Using these two pieces of information, plus the destination web-site address, the generator computes a persona for this web site on the user's behalf. The persona consists of an alias username, alias password, and an alias e-mail address for the user at the particular site.
-Browsing proxy: increases a user's privacy by providing indirection on the TCP level and filtering on the HTTP level.
-E-mail forwarder: forwards mail addressed to a persona e-mail address to the corresponding user.
Our intention to quickly deploy a trial version prevented us from considering browser changes (no source code available at the time). Furthermore, distributing software that contains cryptographic modules posed difficulties that at the very least would delay our trial considerably. As a result, we decided to implement LPWA for a public trial using the following two components:
-An HTTP proxy server, located on our premises in Murray Hill, New
Jersey, that implements both the Browsing Proxy and the Persona Generator. This configuration is depicted in Figure 3 .
-A remailer, located on the same machine as the proxy server, that implements the E-mail Forwarder.
Again, in the interests of creating a demonstration site quickly, we chose to forward e-mail, rather than to implement the e-mail-handling scheme described in Section 4. In e-mail forwarding, the alias e-mail is an encoded, encrypted version of the user's real email address. The forwarding engine decodes and decrypts the alias e-mail address to derive the user's real e-mail address and to forward the message to that address. Obviously this approach entails a trust relationship between the user and LPWA that is significantly different from the scheme we described earlier.
The Appendix contains a more detailed description of the design and implementation of LPWA. It also summarizes the experience from the public trial of LPWA.
SUMMARY
We have described a client-based cryptographic engine that allows clients to efficiently establish and maintain persistent anonymous (or pseudonymous) relationships with multiple servers. The relationships allow the clients to be recognized by the servers, and may employ weak or strong authentication. The cryptographic engine ensures that the clients do not reveal their true identity, and the servers cannot infer other relationships that the client may have established with other servers. We have presented the specification and construction of the Janus function, which can be used to establish such persistent anonymous relationships.
The Janus function is used in the Lucent Personalized Web Assistant (LPWA), which is a practical system that provides persistent anonymous relations between users and Web sites on the Internet. LPWA generates a different persona for each web site for a given user. The persona comprises an alias username, an alias password, and an alias e-mail address. Users configure their browsers' HTTP proxy setting to use the LPWA HTTP proxy. (The trial LPWA proxy was located at lpwa.com.) Subsequently, at the beginning of a browsing session, users are presented with the LPWA start-up page. This page asks users to supply their User IDs (real e-mail addresses) and Secret (universal passwords). From that point on, LPWA is transparent while users are browsing the web. Whenever a web site asks users to supply any username, password, or e-mail address, users may invoke LPWA by supplying a corresponding LPWA escape sequence. As it passes along the request to the destination web site, LPWA recognizes these sequences, computes a persona username, password, or e-mail address specific to that web site, and inserts them into the users' requests. On repeat visits, LPWA will produce those same personae, so when users return to a web site, they are recognized as repeat visitors. When a web-site sends a message to a persona e-mail address, the message arrives at LPWA, which then forwards the message to the corresponding users. One of the design requirements of LPWA is that it should follow the HTTP standard in order to make it more widely usable. This section contains a short review of the relevant parts of the HTTP protocol that are important for the operation of LPWA.
The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is the controlling protocol for the web. HTTP is a stateless protocol between a client and a server. A client (typically a web browser) connects to a server, sends a request line and zero or more request headers, and possibly a message body (such as the contents of a form), and awaits a response. The server responds with a status line, zero or more response headers, and usually a message body (such as a web page). After this transaction, both sides will close the connection. (More recent versions of HTTP allow for both sides to keep the connection open, but any subsequent requests are treated as logically independent.) An HTTP proxy server acts as a go-between, sitting between the user's web browser and the intended server (denoted the origin server). To the user's browser, the proxy behaves like a server; to the origin server it behaves like a client. When a browser connects to the proxy, the proxy must interpret the request and make its own request to the origin server. It must then interpret the response from the origin server and pass the response along to the browser.
A.3 Design of the LPWA HTTP Proxy
In this section we first present our design requirements for the proxy. We then show how the user-supplied identification (User ID and Secret, as described in Section 6) is managed. Finally, we describe LPWA's filtering of privacy-sensitive HTTP header fields.
A.3.1 Requirements. We had several design requirements for the LPWA HTTP proxy:
(1) It should work with most already available web browsers.
(2) It should be easy to use and work transparently.
(3) It should be relatively easy to implement.
(4) It should be stateless.
(5) It should follow the HTTP standard, RFC 2068 [Fielding et al. 1997] .
A.3.1.1 Browsers. We wanted to build, test, and deploy LPWA quickly. These factors precluded any kind of custom web browser. Thus, although the LPWA technology could be incorporated into a web browser, we deliberately chose a mechanism that would work with existing browsers. At the time we designed the system, the two most widely used browsers were Netscape Navigator version 3 and Microsoft Internet Explorer version 3.
A.3.1.2 Easy to Use and Transparent. If users were going to find LPWA convenient, it had to be easy to use and nonintrusive. So we made it simple Secure and Pseudonymous Client-Relationships
• to set up a browser to use LPWA, and, after the initial identification, LPWA becomes invisible.
A.3.1.3 Easy to Implement. We decided to base the LPWA proxy on the Apache server, a public domain server produced by the Apache Group. This server is widely used, and the source code is freely available and actively supported. We found that our changes could be inserted "surgically" with modest changes to the existing code base.
A.3.1.4 Stateless. For both operational and privacy reasons we decided that the proxy server should retain no information about user identities. From an operational standpoint, making the server stateless meant that we could easily stop, restart, or replace the server. The system could easily recover from server or machine crashes. Furthermore, if there were a wide selection of LPWA proxies available worldwide, a user could use any one of them equally well. From a security standpoint, not keeping state information on the server reduces the threat to privacy. If identities necessarily had to be kept on the server, an intruder could possibly obtain the identity information and learn who is using the server.
Statelessness would be less important if the proxy server were to reside on an intranet's firewall, as described earlier. In that case, the server is within a trusted environment, and keeping state allows for some interesting extensions.
A.3.1.5 Follow the HTTP Standard. Adhering to published standards renders LPWA more widely usable, which was our goal.
A.3.2 Management of User ID and Secret. Given the above requirements regarding statelessness, we needed to find a way to coax a web browser to remember the user-supplied information and to forward it to the LPWA proxy with each HTTP request. An obvious choice is using HTTP's Proxy-Authorization header.
A.3.3 How to Keep State in a Stateless Proxy. One of our design requirements was that the LPWA HTTP proxy should be stateless, which meant that the proxy could not retain the User ID and Secret for active browsing sessions from one request to the next. However, for LPWA to be as easy to use as possible, the user should have to enter her User ID and Secret at most once per session. We resolved this contradiction by inducing the browser to tag each user request with the User ID and Secret information. The LPWA proxy uses this information whenever it has to compute an alias. In all other cases this information is discarded. The next section describes the mechanism we used to tag HTTP requests.
A.3.3.1 Using Proxy Authentication. In HTTP, a proxy may require user authentication. Typically authentication is required to verify that a user is authorized to use the proxy. LPWA uses this mechanism for another purpose. A proxy demands authentication by answering an HTTP request with a response that contains an appropriate (error) status code and a response header. Upon seeing the particular status code and header, a browser presents a dialog box to the user that asks for a Username and Password for the proxy. After the user fills in the information, the browser repeats the original request, this time adding a Proxy-Authorization request header with the request; it contains the Username and Password. Thereafter, every request that the browser sends to the proxy includes the same Proxy-Authorization request header. A normal proxy verifies that the information in Proxy-Authorization matches some table of authorized users, but LPWA uses it differently. The fact that the ProxyAuthorization request header accompanies every request is exactly the kind of mechanism we needed for LPWA. (The proxy authentication Username and Password serve as the LPWA User ID and Secret.) LPWA removes the Proxy-Authorization request header before it forwards the request.
A.3.3.2 The LPWA Login Process. We modified the Apache proxy code so that it will only forward requests that include a well-formed ProxyAuthorization header. Otherwise the proxy rejects the request, as outlined above, which induces the browser to ask the user for authentication information (User ID and Secret).
Our design of the LPWA login sequence went through four iterations. Responding to users' comments, we tried to reduce the amount of typing users must do. However, we wanted to preserve some level of safety, because if users enter the wrong User ID or Secret, the generated personae will be incorrect, and users will be unable to access their personalized information. In the final version, the LPWA proxy gives users the choice of entering the User ID and Secret twice (the "safer" method) or once (the "quicker" method).
To detect errors, we stored a cryptographic hash value of each UserID/ Secret pair encountered by the proxy, so the proxy could distinguish between first time and repeat users (without inferring their identities), and to provide distinct greetings. Thus, when a repeat user mistypes her UserID and Secret, the proxy greets her as a first time user, which alerts her to the mistake. The greeting page provides the user a second chance to login, so that any user so alerted can correct her mistake. This addition is a slight departure from the statelessness requirement, but was well received by LPWA users.
A.3.4 The LPWA Proxy in Use. After successfully logging into LPWA, a user surfs the Web transparently with respect to LPWA. But note that each HTTP request by the user and each answer by the web site is routed through LPWA, thus providing the required indirection. A user explicitly invokes LPWA whenever a persona is needed by typing one of the following LPWA escapes: Users can supply these escapes in two contexts: in HTML forms and as identity information for HTTP basic authentication. Basic authentication is similar to the previously described proxy authentication, except that the origin server, instead of the LPWA proxy, demands the authentication information.
A.3.5 Other Proxy Processing. In the interests of enhanced privacy and security, LPWA filters HTTP request headers. Specifically: -The From header, which is seldom used, but which could contain the user's real e-mail address, is removed.
-The User-Agent header, which can disclose information about what type of machine the user has, is trimmed to remove the platform-specific information. The latter is a potential hint for a hacker trying to break into the user's machine.
-The Referer [sic] header is removed. Referer contains the URL of the web page in which the URL of the current request appeared. Thus, it permits a server to learn the previous page the user visited, which may contain personal information, especially if it is a user's home page, "personal favorites" page, or information about the user's organization. The problem with removing this header is that there are sites that restrict access based on the value of the Referer field. For example, one web site of syndicated comic-strips restricts access to requests where the Referer has the value of a newspaper site. We accommodate such cases via a configuration file; this is discussed further in Section A.5.
A.4 Design of LPWA E-Mail Forwarding
As described earlier, the LPWA proxy creates an alias e-mail address for users in response to the \@ escape in forms. Earlier we described an e-mail scheme in which the alias e-mail address generated is the alias username at an appropriate domain; lpwa.com in our case. The e-mail system then stores incoming messages and a user agent retrieves messages for all aliases that belong to a particular user. This scheme has the advantage that the alias e-mail address generation is trivial and that no privacycompromising information has to be stored on the e-mail system. However, such a scheme is better suited for environments in which the proxy resides on a firewall or an ISP access point. In our trial configuration as an external proxy, users typically expect e-mail to be forwarded to their real mailbox. In our earlier paper [Gabber et al. 1997] , we describe such a scheme and show that the resulting alias e-mail address has the same desirable properties as the alias username and password. Actively forwarding without maintaining state implies that the alias e-mail address is an encryption of the user's real e-mail address (User ID). The drawback of such a scheme is that the proxy and the forwarder must store the secret encryption/decryption key. Possession of this key compromises user privacy, and hence security of this key is paramount.
Note that storing the encryption/decryption key does not contradict the statelessness of the proxy, since the key is fixed and may be considered as a part of the proxy code.
While implementing LPWA, we quickly noticed that many web sites limit e-mail addresses in registration forms to some arbitrary and rather small length. The method of Gabber et al. [1997] produces alias e-mail addresses that are too long. Hence, we had to resort to a more heuristic approach: We first compressed the user's real e-mail address, which is the LPWA User ID, and then encrypted it to generate the mailbox part of the alias address. The domain name part of the alias address is the address of the machine that runs the LPWA e-mail forwarding software. The forwarding software is derived from a Simple Mail Transport Protocol (SMTP) gateway daemon that was written at Bell Labs. It was modified so that the incoming mailbox name is decrypted to reverse the previous encryption. If the decryption fails to result in a valid e-mail address (according to RFC 822 [Crocker 1982] ), the forwarder rejects the e-mail, and it writes a log entry. Otherwise the forwarder uses the host system's e-mail subsystem (qmail, in our case) to forward the e-mail on to the true recipient.
A.4.1 Antispam Tool. As part of the Persona Generator, a user obtains a different and seemingly unrelated alias e-mail address for each web site for which she or he registered. For example, a user might be known as hwfyh8yocY8XUKm9t5OKvnNW@lpwa.com to my.yahoo.com and as lN8illidPtFk50SthNoXzGuS@lpwa.com to www.expedia.com. This feature enables effective filtering of junk e-mail (spam), as follows.
Whenever the LPWA E-mail Forwarder decrypts an alias e-mail address in order to forward a message to the user's real e-mail address, it includes the alias e-mail address in the CC e-mail header of the forwarded message. We decided to use the CC field, since many commercial e-mail readers already support filtering incoming e-mail messages based on this field.
Assume that a user registers at www.crook.com and LPWA creates bd1YnEW0mot3CX-_UxonbznP@lpwa.com as the alias e-mail address. Now the address database at crook.com gets sold to spammers. As soon as the user gets the first piece of junk e-mail, he can install a local mail filter for the string bd1YnEW0mot3CX-_UxonbznP. This will block all e-mail caused by the selling of the crook's database to spammers, while at the same time e-mail from all other sites will remain unaffected. Most current antispam tools filter according to sender addresses or keywords, both of which are easily changed by spammers (e.g., address spoofing). Our method is the first to filter according to the recipient address. A spammer who bought the address database from crook knows the user only as bd1YnEW0mot3CX-_ UxonbznP@lpwa.com, and hence cannot change (spoof) this string! Secure and Pseudonymous Client-Relationships • Furthermore, the user can easily keep a small local database, mapping alias e-mail addresses to the web site for which the address was created. Then, when receiving junk e-mail, the user can determine which web site is responsible, even when the junk e-mail was sent by a third party. The user can complain to the web site or take other action, as needed.
Although LPWA provides an effective tool for filtering spam, it cannot help when a permanent e-mail address is sold to spammers. For example, a user opens an account with a bank using an alias e-mail address, which the bank later sells to others. If the e-mail address cannot be changed, the user must filter messages sent by parties other than the bank. The user can use the above local database for this purpose.
A.5 Problems and Their Solutions
After extensive internal testing, we announced a public LPWA trial that became operational in June 1997 and ran until July 1999. In this section we describe the problems we encountered and their solutions during both the testing and the public trial.
As described in the previous sections, the LPWA design is conceptually simple. But the devil (or God) is, as always, in the details. Initially we solved the problems we encountered by building the changes directly into the LPWA proxy source. Eventually it became evident that what we needed was to add directives to our modified Apache proxy server, so we could change things easily through the server's configuration file.
These are some of the problems we encountered:
-Some sites use one server to handle registrations (e.g., verify.nytimes.com) and another to handle returning logins (e.g., www.nytimes.com). Because the personae that LPWA generates for these two sites are different, a return login fails. We created a way for LPWA to treat the sites as equivalent, after which the personae generated for them were the same.
-Some sites would not function correctly without a Referer header. Usually when this was the case, the site insisted on seeing a Referer header to gain access to an interior web page. We did not consider it to be a privacy risk to provide such a header when the Referer was from the same site, so we programmed LPWA to provide such a header, but only for the sites that required it.
-We had many problems with e-mail forwarding. Some sites' registration forms had too little space for the alias e-mail address. Worse were the sites that would not accept valid e-mail addresses (according to RFC 822) because they contained some nonalphanumeric characters. Worst of all were those that accepted the e-mail address but did not treat the mailbox part as being case-sensitive (again violating RFC 822). We went through a series of adjustments to our encoding algorithm as we coped with these problems, leading finally to a monocase alphanumeric encoding.
A.6 Performance
Introducing a proxy between the user's browser and the originating server will always produce a performance penalty because of the extra-hop TCP/IP connection. We wanted to verify that LPWA's processing was otherwise inconsequential, and indeed it was. The actual proxy processing delay, that is, the time between when the proxy read an HTTP request from the browser and started to make a new request to the origin server (not counting the extra TCP connection), was about 4 ms. (on a 166MHz Pentium, running Linux). The total CPU time that the proxy required to process a request was about 10 ms. The time to process requests that contained LPWA escape sequences was unmeasurably different from requests without them. By contrast, the time to set up the connection from the client to the proxy (the client and proxy were "close") was about 35 ms. Clearly, the best way to minimize the performance impact of an LPWA HTTP proxy is to place it as close to users as possible. In a dial-up ISP setting, that would mean putting the proxy close to the dial-up access servers. In a corporate setting, that would mean putting the proxy near the corporate firewall.
A.7 Trial Experience
The LPWA trial ran from June 1997 to July 1999, and attracted over 100,000 unique users. About 35% of those users logged in more than once. For the final few months, an average of 700 to 800 distinct returning users logged into LPWA every day. In order to count the users without compromising their anonymity, the LPWA proxy logged the one-way hash value of the User ID and Secret.
The trial version of LPWA was available at lpwa.com. Apart from network problems early on and some later hardware failures, the LPWA proxy ran smoothly. Likewise, the e-mail forwarding software ran well (for correctly supplied To addresses), forwarding over a thousand messages per day.
Based on the number of users logging in and on the network traffic, we believe that the trial has been a success. The LPWA user base grew steadily, despite performance degradation for those users whose location is "inconvenient" with respect to the proxy's location in Murray Hill, New Jersey.
